THE CUMBERLAND CHURCH CASES-SOME NOTES
UPON A PROLONGED AND WIDE-SPREAD
LITIGATION.
The validity of the union, or merger and consolidation, of
the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian
Church of the United States has been contested in so many
courts, state and federal, has been the subject of so long a litigation, extending over eight years, from 1907 to 1914, has been of
such vital interest to many members of the two denominations, has
affected such an amount of property, has covered, in numerous
briefs of counsel and opinions of judges, such a wide discussion
of the relation of the civil courts to religious bodies and so
copious a citation of authorities, that it is impossible within due
limits to condense a summary of the reported cases affecting it.'
It is to be observed that while allegiance to any church is of
small moment to men who are indifferent to all churches, and
that while many persons may regard as trivial every cherished
belief in doctrine or any love of ecclesiastical government or
form of worship, yet to thousands of adherents of particular
sects such matters are full of meaning. Tenets, rules, symbols,
that are null and void to one, are of precious value to another.
Constitutions, government, dogmas, with interpretations and distinctions, which to the man outside of a religious body, are
merely "the ingenious quodlibets of a dialectician," are of vital
import to the loyal believer.
In no branch of theological belief is this intensity of conviction stronger than in the system called Calvinism. He whose
name is given to it, and his successors in its maintenance, William the Silent, Luther, Knox, Melville, Murray, Coligny, Cromwell, Milton, Bunyan, Jonathan Edwards, and many others,
Questions incidental to the particular suits, e.g., of jurisdiction or of
procedure, may be disregarded. Illustrations of such points are found in
Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U. S. 32, 32 Sup. Ct. IO, 56 L. Ed. 17 (1911) (See
also 213 Fed. 648) and Sharp v. Bonham, 224 U. S. 241, 32 Sup. Ct. 420,
56 L. Ed. 747 (1912) (See also 213 Fed. 66o). Nor is the specific recovery

sought in any individual suit material.
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were men of unbending determination. The historians Froude
and Bancroft, though not among its ranks, have given high praise
to its supporters, notably for their advocacy of civil and religious
liberty. John Morley, in his life of Oliver Cromwell, commenting on what is called fatalism, wrote: 2
"On the contrary Calvinism exalted its votaries to a pitch of
heroic moral energy that has never been surpassed; and men who
were bound to suppose themselves moving in chains inexorably
riveted, along a track ordained by a despotic and unseen Will before
time began, have yet exhibited an active courage, a resolute endurance, a cheerful self-restraint, an exulting self-sacrifice, that men
count the highest glories of the human Conscience."
Many quotations of weight might be added, but enough is stated
to give a comprehension of the tenacity with which the dissenting members of the Cumberland Church, even though their
Calvinism was of a milder type than that of the other Church,
contested the legal validity of the union with the other branch
of Presbyterians.
It is pertinent at the threshold of any notice of the Cumberland Church cases to quote from the opinion of Mr. Justice
Miller in the case of Watson v. Jones,3 called "that great case,"
undoubtedly the leading American case on the relation of our
civil polity to religious bodies, and the authority cited in numerous subsidiary cases.
"The questions which have come before the civil courts concerning the rights of property held by ecclesiastical bodies, may, so far
as we have been able to examine them, be profitably classified under
three general heads, which of course do not include cases governed
by considerations applicable to a church established and supported
by law as the religion of the state.
"The first of these is when the property which is the subject of
controversy has been, by the deed or will of the donor, or other instrument by which the property is held, by the express terms of the
instrument devoted to the teaching, support or spread of some
specific form of religious doctrine or belief.
"The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church
'Morley: Life of Oliver Cromwell, p. 48.
3 13 Wall. 679, 722 (187I).
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government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher
authority.
"The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical
body holding the property is but a subordinate member of some
general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or
less complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization.
"In regard to the first of these classes it seems hardly to admit
of a rational doubt that an individual or an association of individuals may dedicate property by way of trust to the purpose of sustaining, supporting, and propagating definite religious doctrines or
principles, provided that in doing so they violate no law of morality;
and give to the instrument by which their purpose is evidenced, the
formalities which the laws require. And it would seem also to be
the obvious duty of the court, in a case properly made, to see that
the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is
thus attached to its use. So long as there are persons qualified within the meaning of the original dedication, and who are also willing
to teach the doctrines or principles prescribed in the act of dedication, and so long as there is any one so interested in the execution
of the trust as to have a standing court, it must be that they can
prevent the diversion of the property or fund to other and different
uses. This is the general doctrine of courts of equity as to charities,
..
and it seems equally applicable to ecclesiastical matters .
"But the third of these classes of cases is the one which is most
often found in the courts, and which, with reference to the number
and difficulty of the questions involved, and to other considerations,
is in every way the most important.
"It is the case of property acquired in any of the usual modes
for the general use of a religious congregation which is itself part
of a large and general organization of some religious denomination,
with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious views
and ecclesiastical government. .
"In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should
govern the civil courts, founded on a broad and sound view of the
relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority, is that,
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and binding on them, in their
application to the case before them."
It is submitted that the facts of the union of the Cumberland Presbyterian and the Northern Presbyterian Churches do
not come exactly under any of the three suppositions just quoted,
even if the classification be deemed as logical as it is authoritative.

THE CUMBERLAND CHURCH CASES

Perhaps the clearest statement of the facts which underlie
these cases is to be found in the elaborate and able opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Cobb in Mack v. Kime.4 The Cumberland Presbyterian Church was organized in Tennessee in i8io. The founderg
were the ministers of what is now known as the Northern Presbyterian Church, who rejected certain doctrines taught in the Westminster Confession. In 1828 the General Assembly of the
Cumberland Church was formed. Its form of government was
patterned largely after that of the parent church. It grew in
members and in influence, and in 19o6 it contained seventeen
Synods, one hundred and fourteen Presbyteries and a total membership of nearly two hundred thousand. In 1903 a desire for
union of broad scope with all Presbyterian organizations took
definite shape and various steps were taken which finally culminated in the adoption of the report of the Committee on Union
and Reunion, by the General Assembly of the Cumberland Church
at Decatur, Illinois, in May, 19o6. Upon the adoption of this
report, the General Assembly adjourned sine die, to meet thereafter only as a component part of the General Assembly of the
Northern Presbyterian Church. Developments from this point
are described in the report as follows:
"It also appeared that prior to the action of the General Assembly the question of reunion had been submitted to the different
Presbyteries, and one hundred and eleven Presbyteries had expressed themselves; sixty of them voting approval, and fifty-one disapproval. It thus appears that a majority of the Presbyteries and
a majority of the commissioners in the General Assembly had declared in favor of the union. It is contended, however, by the dissenting members of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church that an
analysis of the vote in the Presbyteries will show that a majority
of the. individuals composing these Presbyteries did not favor the
reunion; that is, that while a majority of the Presbyteries, as such,
favored the union, the majority of the members composing the different Presbyteries did not approve of the union. Before the adjournment of the General Assembly at Decatur those commissioners, who were opposed to the union entered their protest against the
adoption of the report of the committee; and after the General
Assembly had adjourned without a date, to meet in subsequent years
as a component part of the Northern Presbyterian Church, the
4 129

Ga. x, 58 S. E. 184, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.), 675 (1907).
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dissenting members assembled themselves together and declared
themselves to be the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, and proceeded to exercise, as far as they could, the
powers of such body. The case which we now have in mind is one
of the numerous controversies which sprang up in the territory
covered by the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, bringing in question the regularity of the alleged5 union between that church and the
Northern Presbyterian Church.
The decisions of the courts as to the validity of this union
between the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and the Northern
Presbyterian Church have produced a direct conflict of authority,,
though a vast majority of the.cases have upheld the validity of
the union. 6 On the one hand it has been held invalid by the Supreme Courts of two states ;7 on the other it has been held valid
Its validity has also
in the Supreme Courts of nine states."
been recently sustained by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee in the cases of Sherard v.
Walton 9 and Helm v. Zarecor,10 and in the recent Missouri case
of Hayes v. Manning."
The contentions in opposition to the validity of the union
are strongly stated in the briefs in the respective appeals. The
following points are extracted, in reduced expression and number, from the arguments of counsel for the defendants in error
12
in Brown v. Clark.
'Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. i, at p. 4.
'See opinion of Sanford, J., in Helm v. Zarecor, supra, note i.
"Landrith v. Hudgins, I2I Tenn. 556, 120 S. W. 783 (igog); Boyles v.
Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S. W. 8o5 (igog); and Bonham v. Harris, 125
Tenn. 452, 145 S.W. 169 (ig1).
'Mack v. Kime, supra, note 4; Wallace v. Hughes, 131 Ky. 445, 15 S.
W. 684 (igO); Brown v. Clark, 1o2 Tex. 323, II6 S. W. 36o, 24 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 670 (igog); Permanent Committee of Missions v. Pacific Synod,
157 Cal. Io5, xo6 Pac: 395 (191o); Ramsey v. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 92 N. E.
164, 3o L. R. A. (N. S.) 665 (I9IO), reversing Ramsey v. Hicks, 44 Ind.
App. 490, 89 N. E. 597 (igog) ; First Presbyterian Church v. First Cumberland Presbyterian Church, 245 Ill. 74, 91 N. E. 761 (191o); Sanders v.
Baggerly, 96 Ark. 117, 131 S. W. 49 (I9IO); Harris v. Cosby, 173 Ala. 81,
55 So. 231 (IgII); and Carothers v. Moseley, 99 Miss. 671, 56 So. 88i
(1911).

'2o6 Fed. 562 (913).
"0Supra, note i.
21172 S. W. 897 (1914)-.
'Supra,

note 8.
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i. The effect of the declaration that union had been accomplished is an ecclesiastical question, and is not binding upon the
civil courts.
2. The confessions of faith of the twochurches are different,
and it is a diversion of the property of the Cumberland Church to
devote said property to the Presbyterian Church.
3. The scheme was one of merger and absorption, not authorized by the constitution of the Cumberland Church, and in conflict
with it.
4. The express restriction found in section twenty-five 1 is
equivalent to an affirmative prohibition against the usurpation of
any power not specifically given.
5: The inquiry whether or not the alleged union and merger
were in conformity to the constitution of this church is not ecclesiastical; it is the "same question that might arise with respect to any
voluntary association in which its constitution was intended to be
mutually binding upon all its members, and to protect and preserve
the society by recalling it to a recognition of its own organic law."
6. The power to change the constitution, conferred by section
sixty 14 therefore, does not authorize the General Assembly and
Presybteries to destroy the constitution, or the church, by amendment or otherwise.
7. The constitution is an instrument of delegated powers, specific and limited.
section of the constitution reads as follows:
"The Church Session exercises jurisdiction over a single church; the
Presbytery over what is common to the ministers, Church Sessions, and
Churches within a prescribed district; the Synod over what belongs in
common to three or more Presbyteries, and their ministers, Church Sessions,
and Churches; and the General Assembly over such matters as concern
the whole church; and the jurisdiction of these courts is limited by the
express provisions of the constitution. Every court has the right to resolve
questions of doctrine and discipline seriously and reasonably proposed, and
in general to maintain truth and righteousness, condemning erroneous
opinions and practices which tend to the injury of the peace, purity, or
progress of the church; and, although each court exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters specially belonging to it, the lower courts are
subject-to the review and control of the higher courts, in regular gradation."
"This section reads as follows:
"Upon the recommendation of the General Assembly, at a stated meeting, by a two-thirds vote of 'the members thereof voting thereon, the Confessions of Faith, Catechism, constitution, and Rules of Discipline may be
amended or changed when a majority of the Presbyteries, upon the sam
being transmitted for their action, shall approve thereof. The other parts
of the government-that is to say, the general regulations, the directory for
worship, and the rules of order-may be amended or changed at any meeting of the General Assembly by a vote of two-thirds of the entire number
of commissioners enrolled at that meeting, provided such amendment or
change shall not conflict, in letter or spirit with the Confession of Faith,
Catechism, or constitution."
'This
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8. The provisions of section sixty,' of the constitution of the
Cumberland Church are mandatory, and must be strictly followed
in order to accomplish a legal change.
9. Nothing that the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church has done, or could have done, precludes civil courts
from inquiring or deciding for themselves, when civil rights are
involved, whether or not the doctrines of the two churches in question are the same substantially, and whether or not the action taken
in reference to the so-called union and merger was authorized by
the constitution of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church.
io. The property involved in this particular cause belonged to
the local congregation. Where a congregation is divided, the civil
court will, upon its own investigation, award the local property t6
those members, whether a minority or majority, who adhere to the
original organization, and are acting in harmony with its own laws,
and the laws, usages, customs, principles and doctrines which were
accepted among them before the dispute began-and are the standard
for determining the controversy.
It is hoped also that the foregoing points, though curtailed,
comprise, in effect, the results of the comprehensive discussions
of the judges who wrote for the majority of their respective
16
benches in the cases of Boyles v. Roberts, Landrithv. Hudginslr
18
The opinions are elaborate, exhaustive
and Bonham v. Harris.
and entitled to great respect. The analysis of the distinctions
between the credal declarations is clearly and learnedly argued.
This question is put by one of the writers, in this way:
"Can the simple statements which we have copied from the
Cumberland Presbyterian Confession of Faith be held a full equivalent of the vast and imposing theological structure contained in the
Westminster Confession of Faith ?"
The ordinary lay mind would answer, "No," but the question
seems futile, because the ecclesiastical jurisdiction had settled it
-according to the weight of authority. In the above three
opinions, however, the contrary view is asserted and maintained.
The crucial paramount postulate of general interest in each may
be rendered, perhaps too succinctly, thus: Civil courts are not
bound by the rulings of church courts in cases involving propSee supra, note 14.
"SSupra, note 7.

z'Supra, note 7.
USupra, note 7.
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erty rights. The Tennessee cases now stand, since the late
Missouri case,' 9 separately from the others, per contra, there
being no express trusts shown by the facts.
The views maintained by the appellate tribunals that sustained the validity of the union may be found in the case of
Hayes v. Manning,20 notable for its reversal in effect of the prior
decision of the same court, though with a membership somewhat
changed, in Boyles v. Robeits.2 1

The new opinion is by Mr.

Justice Walker, and three other judges concurred in it, another
concurring only in the result, for a specified reason. Mr. Justice
Graves dissented, adhering to his original position. It is to be
observed that the present determination was reached after mature
study of the whole number of cases previously heard and decided.
Reference to parts of the opinion of Mr. Justice Walker will
show "the last word" upon the several matters in controversy.
A synopsis must suffice.
(i) The right of the General Assembly of the Cumberland
Church to unite with the Presbyterian Church is shown, by repeated
unopposed efforts to unite with other organizations and is a practical interpretation by it of its constitution.
.
(2) The contention is not sustained that despite this long continued construction of the constitution no power exists in the constitution authorizing the union of the church with another organization. The words "the jurisdiction of the church judicatories is
limited by the express provisions of the constitution" 21a are held to
mark the boundaries between the jurisdiction of the four church
courts, the Sessions, Presbytery, Synod and General Assembly, so
as to prevent the encroachment of one upon the authority conferred
on the other. The implied authority to do whatsoever may be
necessary to be done or to exert a power conferred or perform a
duty implied always follows a grant of specific power or the imposition of a definite duty upon a person or a court. (The judge here'
states the authority of the General Assembly.)
(3)The individual members of the Cumberland Church are
bound by the action of the General Assembly and Presbyteries in
effecting the union unless authority to make it has been withheld
by express inhibition from those judicatories which are otherwise
admitted to be clothed with absolute power in directing the affairs
of the church.
"Hayes v. Manning, supra, note ii.
"Supra, note Ii.

74

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

(4) There is no provision in the constitution prohibiting union
by the Cumberland Church with another whose faith is in harmony
with its own.
He concludes as follows:
"The great weight of authority supports the rule that the
decisions of the higher court of a church as to purely ecclesiastical
questions within the jurisdiction of such court to decide will be
accepted as conclusive by the civil courts in determination of property rights."
The learned judge adds to his interesting opinion a fine tribute
to Calvinism.
These words from the opinion of Mr. Justice Sanford, in
Helm v. Zarecor,2 2 also are explicitly positive:
"Without referring in detail to the various objections to the
validity of the union, which are urged with great clearness and
force in the briefs submitted in behalf of the defendants, a full
discussion of which would carry this opinion to undue length, it is
sufficient for present purposes to say, that, after careful consideration of the foregoing cases, I am constrained to conclude that not
only the weight of authority but the sounder reasoning is on the
side of those cases in which the union has been held to be valid.
The reasons leading to that conclusion are stated so fully in the
cases in which the union has been upheld, especially in Wallace v.
Hughes, Ramsey v. Hicks, Sanders v. Baggerly, and First Presbyterian Church v. First Cumberland Presbyterian Church,23 that I
deem it unnecessary to repeat them here. The corner stone upon
which these opinions are, in my judgment, to be based, is the decision in Watson v. Jones,24 in which after careful consideration, it
was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that where in
a controversy in a civil court, the property rights of a religious
organization are dependent upon a question of doctrine, discipline,
ecclesiastical law, rule, custom or church government that has been
decided by the highest tribunal within the organization to which it
has been carried, the civil court will accept that decision as conclusive, and will be governed by it in its decision of the case
before it."
Some reflections come to mind after running over the reports of the foregoing cases. The first is the religious liberty
'Supra, note 7.
"1a See § 25, supra, note 13.

"Supra, note z.
"For the citations of these cases, see supra, note 8.
" Supra, note 3.
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guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. Patriaest communis omnium parens. She gives
her children freedom of conscience. Further, the authoritative
weight of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Watson v. Jones 25 is impressive. Again, there is shown a
notable change of sentiment in the two Presbyterian religious
bodies that became one. Divergences of doctrine which caused
the separation in 18io evaporated in 19o6. Theological tenets,
stated with formality most positive, faded away in the rapprochement. Eminent theologians were left in the vocative. The preponderating majority of the representatives in the several judicatories of each church eliminated distinctions. Deep ploughing
in the soil of theology seemed obsolete.
A fourth thought is that present religious scholarship seems
to be engaged in studies of higher criticism, et id onne genus,
and in matters of modern "liberalism" in the attempt to construct
a broad ethical and (can it be said?) human theology. Such
topics are not for ordinary laymen who were brought up to believe in compendiums of doctrines--definite and stem, perhaps,
but majestic in reverence and in clarity.
We may notice particularly the new spirit of church unity,
deemed splendid in its disregard of all tenets that possibly can be
disregarded in its community of faith and in its catholicity, with
a beneficial purpose for the uplift of men. It is broad in its category of "non-essentials" but fervent in its adherence to unity in
"essentials" and its rallying cry is, "In all things charity."
Again, observe the consideration of every question involved
shown by the judges of the high courts hereinbefore enumerated,
the learning of those who have given the several opinions in their
opposite determinations of the questions involved, and the
obvious sincerity of the judicial convictions reached, all of which
are not forcibly persuasive of the meit of the cry that is sometimes heard for the right to "recall" judges who, under the grave
responsibility of their duty, are firm and unyielding to prejudice,
whether religious or political.
'Supra, note 3.
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Consider, once again, the respect shown by the civil courts
to the thought expressed in the old proverb in Pliny, founded
upon common sense and constantly quoted: Sutor ne ultra crepidam. That this does not obtain everywhere is often apparent
when one sees that scanty knowledge and slight experience, or
even no knowledge and no experience, seem basic for the expression of dogmatic opinions upon questions of theology, medicine, law, finance, economics, or what not. These differ totally
from the conclusions of thoughtful reasoning and from those
progressive ideas and endeavors which are the results of high
unselfish motives and careful study the utterance of which is
intended for the common good of men. Such beneficial declarations are entitled to freedom of speech and indeed cannot be.
suppressed. Yet courts (except, perhaps ex necessitate, as for
example, to preserve trusts for religious uses), 26 do not consider or interpret or promulgate the doctrines of particular
churches. They do not follow as a precedent the well-known
words in "Paradise Lost." 27
"Others apart sat on a hill retired,
In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will, and FateAnd found no end, in wandering mazes lost."
John W. Patton.
Philadelphia,May,
'For
AM.

1915.

cases of trusts, see "The Civil Courts and the Churches," 54

LAw REG. 391.
'Milton:
Paradise

Lost, Book II, line 556.

